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              It has been a good and successful partnership-but it's now time for the United States to leave NATO. The
              Cold War is over. There is now only one military and economic superpower-the United States, a nation with
              global interests. The security and economic viability of Western Europe is one of those interests-but only
 one.
 ******************************** 
The 1995 debate over sending a large American force into Bosnia-Herzegovina (as part of a NATO
              peacekeeping force) has come and gone, yet the question of what role NATO should play in the affairs of
              Europe, and what role the United States should play in NATO, is far from settled. If anything, the issue is
              more obscure than ever.(1) 
While granting that 20,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Bosnia in an expeditious manner and that five
              months into their planned year long stay, American casualties have been minimal, this exercise in the use of
              military force has still not convinced a majority of Americans that United States involvement was necessary
              and that the $2 billion plus cost of the deployment was a prudent use of taxpayer dollars.
              Stripped of all subtleties, the question for most Americans is: How did the United States get involved in what
              is perceived as an essentially European conflict, one not contemplated or planned for when the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in l949? The follow-on questions, however, are even more
              important. Is the Bosnia deployment a precedent for future commitments of American military power? Is it
              in the best interest of the United States to be tightly bound to a regional alliance, howbeit a very powerful
              one, in a world where America's national interests are global and generally changing? In a world where
              balance of power diplomacy is probably the best alternative to the United States becoming the world's
 policeman?
 NATO
              By l949, the United States and the countries of Western Europe realized that rebuilding Europe economically
              would not in itself be sufficient to deter Soviet expansion westward. Thus was born a military alliance, the
              North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whose chief purpose was to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. 
The operative clause in the agreement was that an attack on one member was an attack on all. On April 4,
              l949, 12 nations signed on: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
              Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. France formally withdrew from the alliance
              in l965; Greece and Turkey were added in l952, West Germany in l954 and Spain in l982.(2) American
              steadfastness to the alliance concept, together with its nuclear arsenal, kept the peace in Europe until the
              breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
With the end of the Soviet threat, NATO became an organization in search of a mission. If NATO was to
              continue, its mission had to be redefined. But redefined to do what? To prevent what? The American interest
              in keeping NATO was straightforward-to maintain a major presence in Europe at a time when the 12 nation
              European Community was increasingly taking positions at odds with American political and economic
              objectives. 
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The European view of the role of the United States in Europe (and the world) was that as long as the United
              States continued to proclaim it was the only remaining military and economic superpower, then let it act out
              the part, a view which quickly led to the perception that unless the United States acted (in one crisis or
              another) nothing would happen. This, of course, begs the question of what should happen . 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
              Bosnia-Herzegovina is a newly created country that was once part of the former Yugoslavia. Between
              1993-95, its two main ethnic groups-Serbs and Muslims-fought a bitter and ruthless civil war, a war which
              spilled over into neighboring Croatia, and one that could easily involve several other countries.(3) 
The conflict, however, went far beyond the accepted bounds of warfare. Serb forces were accused of
              atrocities that rivaled those of Hitler's Germany. And as more atrocities were documented, scores of Serb
              leaders were indicted for war crimes by an international tribunal. Casualties on all sides, both civilian and
              military, numbered in the hundreds of thousands. And like the Viet Nam War of a generation ago, it was a
              conflict where the suffering (in color) was there for all to see on worldwide television. The word from 
Western capitals was-the conflict must end.(4)
              Into this boiling pool of hate and rage stepped the United Nations, the world agency charged with
              promoting peace, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the world's strongest military alliance. While
              world opinion expected and supported UN efforts to mediate the conflict, the role of NATO and the United
              States as NATO's leader, was contentious from the beginning. 
The first two and one half years of fighting was heavily in favor of the Bosnian Serbs. Over half of
              Bosnia-Herzegovina was controlled by Serb forces as well as parts of Croatia. In the latter half of l995,
              however, the war turned against the Serbs with the result that diplomats saw an opportunity for a
              negotiated peace. The agreement that was reached called for a NATO ground force of 60,000 troops to act as
              peacekeepers. President Clinton pledged that 20,000 heavily armed American combat units would be part of
              this contingent, and in December of l995 delivered on that commitment. 
BEYOND BOSNIA 
The immediate question is: Can the United States continue to guarantee the security of Western Europe,
              which is in its own interest, but not become involved in local European conflicts? 
A United States role in a redefined NATO has not been without proposed options and attendant
              rationalizations. One widely discussed option is for the United States to remain in NATO, but with a clear
              understanding of when American forces will and will not be used. The option anticipates U.S. forces
              remaining in Europe with NATO forces under an American commander as in the present case.(5) 
A second option, and the one suggested in this paper, is for the United States to withdraw from NATO after
              giving the required one year notice. During the one year grace period, NATO's European members would
              form a NATO-like military alliance, one with which the United States would conclude a mutual security pact.
              Canada and Iceland, and perhaps Turkey, might opt to reach mutual security arrangements with the United
              States on a bilateral basis. It would be their choice to make. 
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There are a number of advantages to such an arrangement. 
A continuing guarantee by the United States to come to Western Europe's assistance should an
 outside threat to its security arise;
                           Expanding membership in a European security organization, minus the United States, would be
                           viewed by Russia as less threatening to its territorial integrity;
                           More freedom of action for the United States to negotiate mutual security agreements with
                           non-Western European nations, including Russia;
                           Providing humanitarian assistance when called upon would be politically much easier when there
                           was little possibility of being involved in local conflicts, not only in Europe but worldwide; and
                           Development of a model for guaranteeing the security of regional groups of friendly countries
                           without the risk of becoming the world's policeman.
              Of the advantages cited should the United States formally withdraw from NATO, the one with the most far
              reaching global implications is greater American flexibility to conclude mutually beneficial security
              arrangements with other nations, particularly to enter into balance of power arrangements. 
BEYOND EUROPE: THE BALANCE OF 
POWER CONCEPT
              Briefly stated, the United States simply does not have the capability (within foreseeable defense budgets) to
              maintain a 100,000 man presence in every area of the world where it has paramount national interests.(6) 
And even should it be willing to make such a commitment, the presence of American forces in friendly
              countries is always contentious and will likely become more so.(7)
              If large scale deployment of U.S. forces is ruled out-what strategies exist to insure American interests
              worldwide are not only given due consideration, but also backed up by military force? 
The balance of power concept implies the existence of at least three players (nations or alliances) of
              approximately equal military strength. There must be actual or potential conflict (competitive) situations
              wherein the nations or alliances have conflicting objectives, long or short term, that is, objectives that are
              contrary to the national interest(s) of the other players. The nation or alliance exercising the balance of
              power achieves its ends by diplomatically and/or militarily supporting the weaker of the two remaining
              players in a conflict situation. Its weight, together with that of the weaker player, is sufficient to deter the
              strong player from any course of action inimical to the balance of power nation. The last requirement in the
              practice of balance of power politics is a nation's willingness to change sides as the situation dictates. As it has
              been said before-"nations do not have perpetual allies, but only perpetual interests." The classic example of
              the successful application of the balance of power concept was that of Great Britain in the 19th century.
              British policy was to insure that there was no dominant power on the European continent. The policy was,
              by and large, a success. The result of the policy became generally known as Pax Britannica.
              In the early years of the Cold War (l947-91), the People's Republic of China (PRC) was allied with the Soviet
              Union and its East European allies. It was logical, if not mandatory. Both the PRC and the Soviet Union
              actively supported North Korea in the Korean War. Moreover, in the early 1950s the nuclear power 
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              advantage lay with the United States. Having the PRC in its corner mandated that the United States divide its
              attention and resources between Asia and Western Europe. In the 1970s the PRC was courted by the United
              States to offset an imbalance of conventional forces in Europe. In both cases, while the PRC was the weaker
              third party, at a given point in time its military capability tended to even out the balance of power between
              the two major alliances-NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
              In 1996, there are three, stand alone, first rank military powers in the world-the United States, Russia and the
              People's Republic of China. The PRC can no longer be considered the weaker of the three nations. Each has
 the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other by use of intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying
              atomic or chemical/biological warheads.(8)
              In Europe, the trend is toward a rough military balance between Western European nations on one side and
              Russia on the other. Both sides have adequate or more than adequate atomic arsenals. And although Russia
              still has a significant preponderance of nuclear and conventional forces when contrasted with Western
              Europe, the loss of its Eastern European allies as jumping off points for a surprise attack on the West, makes
              such an attack highly problematic. In short, a strictly West European alliance has the potential to stand toe to
              toe with Russia should a major dispute between the two sides ever arise.(9) And with the United States as a
              third party guarantor of Western European security, the likelihood of such a dispute developing into a
 conflict situation is quite remote. 
AMERICAN INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA
              If it is granted that a rough balance of power can exist in Europe without the presence of l00,000+ American
              troops, can the same be said in East Asia?
 First, who are the players, that is, the major powers with national interests in the region? By any definition,
              they are the People's Republic of China, Russia, Japan and the United States. In terms of economic strength,
              the United States and Japan are in a class of their own. In terms of military power, absent nuclear weapons, it
              is another matter. The People's Republic of China stands alone. 
The second question is: what are the intentions of the PRC? And equally important-have its long term goals,
              and methods of achieving these goals, changed over time. Is there a consistent pattern? If a track record
              means anything, the answer is an emphatic "yes." The PRC was, and still is, the bully of East Asia, not unlike
              Hitler's Germany of the mid and late 1930s. Witness its provoked border wars with India, Vietnam, and the
              former Soviet Union. Its entry in the Korean War on the side of North Korea, an aggressor nation by any
              standard. The ruthless suppression of Tibet, the PRC's unilateral claims to the Spratley Islands, the 
Tiananmen Square massacre, and its overall human rights record. Add to this the death and destruction as a
              result of Communist Party policies in the 1950s and 1960s-The Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution,
              the Hundred Flowers Campaign, and the well documented atrocities of the Red Guards. No less an apologist
 for PRC actions than former President Richard Nixon estimated the slaughter to be in the millions.(10) Other
              sources put the figure in the tens of millions.
              In l996, the government is the same, only the rulers are different. Rulers which authorized one of the world's
              largest nuclear tests in l993 and had no hesitation in attempting to intimidate the Republic of China on 
Taiwan by massive military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in March of l996. Those driving PRC policy in l996
              are the hard liners in the Communist Party and the country's military leadership. Neither group is an
              advocate of peaceful co-existence with its East Asia neighbors or a willingness to arbitrate disputes. In l996,
              there is no way the United States and its nominal allies in East Asia can match PRC conventional land forces. 
And not to be neglected is the PRC drive to create a blue water navy. 
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              Given the above, what option does the United States have to insure its national interests in the region? Two
              are feasible. The first is to encourage Japan to rebuild its military-not in incremental stages as is now the case,
              but a declared buildup of the first order. However, given the assured hostile reaction to such a buildup, not
              only by the PRC but most of the nations in East Asia, together with a significant domestic opposition, such
              an option coming to fruition is no better than a ten to one wager. 
The second option is a mutual security treaty between Russia, Japan and the United States. The salient
              portion of such an agreement would be a guarantee of the political and territorial integrity of the nations of
              East Asia. Plain and simple it is a balance of power option but one that would be "dead on arrival" if the
              United States remains NATO's leader. 
What are the odds for this option coming about? Long indeed until Japan and Russia settle the Kuril Islands
              dispute.(11) Unless the American State Department is conducting a deep cover diplomatic operation, the
              Kuril Islands issue is being treated with a benign neglect. Initial hostility to a tripartite Japan, Russia, United
              States agreement could also be expected from Western European nations, a hostility, however, that could be
              overcome by a firm and unequivocal American commitment to its achievement.
              Given a Kuril Islands settlement Japan's benefit from a mutual security pact is self evident. Two benefits are
              important. First, the passion surrounding the issue of accelerating a military buildup would be dampened.
              Second, its security would not be tied to a single military superpower-but rather two. A secondary benefit
              would be a friendlier climate for Japanese investment in Russia East Asia. 
What benefit would Russia derive from such a pact? The major, and perhaps only benefit, would be a
              guarantee of its Asian (Russia East Asia) territorial integrity. It is of only passing interest that Russia is selling
              high tech weapons to the PRC, financing nuclear reactors, and exchanging high level visits between heads of
              state. At best, such actions provide for only a short term détente. In the not so long run, Russia must come
              to grips with the reality that Russia East Asia is a prize within reach of the People's Republic of China. The
              growing population of China (and where to put them), even with its rigid birth control policies, will be a
              major problem for PRC leaders in the early part of the 21st century. In l996, there are no more than three
              million Russians on its side of the present border. They face upward of 150 million Chinese living in northern
              China. Equally important is the fact that Siberia is a veritable "treasure house" of natural resources; resources
              that the PRC would be more than willing to risk a conflict to obtain. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States cannot and should not be responsible for keeping world order. However, that it remain a
              major player in world events goes without saying. One approach is to maintain a military capability that
              would be superior to any likely combination of challengers, together with a willingness to use such a force
              when necessary. While such an option has its appeal, the cost in dollars makes it prohibitive. And not to
              mention the opposition of a large and vocal segment of the American electorate. The second option is to
              exercise American influence by entering into regional security agreements, such as those proposed for
              Europe and East Asia. Others could be negotiated as circumstances warranted. 
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NOTES 
                      1.Almost from the beginning NATO's mission in Bosnia was controversial. Human rights groups
                           wanted NATO military forces to assist in investigating alleged war crimes. The original mission
                           statement precluded such activity but was later expanded to include this type of assistance. However,
                           NATO forces are not tasked with seeking out and/or "arresting" alleged war criminals. Discussions
                           have also taken place with respect to extending the present one year limit for keeping NATO (U.S.)
 forces in Bosnia.
                      2.France is a major contributor to the 60,000 man international peacekeeping force in
                           Bosnia-Herzegovina. While France is not technically a member of NATO, its foreign policy
                           historically has generally supported NATO objectives. Militarily there is also close cooperation
                           between France and NATO.
                      3.In the first two years of the conflict, Serbia actively supported the Bosnia Serbs. In l995, Iran was
                           identified as a nation proving military training and supplies to Bosnian Muslim forces.
                      4.Several Croat and Muslim military commanders have also been indicted for war crimes. By far,
                           however, the great majority of atrocities (war crimes) are attributed to Bosnia-Serb military and
 para-military forces.
 5.A February 7, l996 Heritage Foundation publication "Getting NATO Back to Basics," cited three
                           guidelines to achieve this goal
 (1) America's principal military role would be to serve NATO's core mission-to protect NATO
                           member states from a major power threat.
 (2) The United States would make a unique contribution to any military operation-not duplicate the
                           capabilities of European NATO members.
 (3) the United States forces contribution would be decisive (in terms of numbers of American combat
 forces) with respect to the core mission of the alliance.
                           One argument of those favoring a continued l00,000 man U.S. military presence in Europe (NATO)
                           cite the possibility that a hard line Russian government at some time in the future might attempt to
 bring eastern European nations back into its sphere of influence, peaceably or otherwise. 
As a possibility this cannot be denied. The question, however, is "how long" must the United States
                           commit its forces in Europe in anticipation of a possible Russian aggressive move against Western
                           Europe? Till the year 2000, 2025, 2050 . . .? As argued in this paper, the greatest threat to Russian
                           territorial integrity is not in Europe but Asia. Accepting this, it is hardly likely that Russia would
                           confront the West in Europe and thus "invite" the People's Republic of China to annex large chunks
                           of Russian Asia.
                      6.The United States has approximately 30,000+ military personnel in South Korea and some 47,000 in
 Japan.
                      7.Vehement protests by local citizens arising from the rape of an Okinawa girl by three U.S.
                           servicemen in l995 is a case in point. The protests and subsequent trial of the defendants received
                           worldwide publicity.
                      8.Whether People's Republic of China missiles have the range and accuracy to hit U.S. West coast
                           targets is an open question. What is not in dispute is that such a capability is inevitable.
                      9.In evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of a stand-alone West European military alliance vs.
                           Russia, the economic strength of Western Europe is a high card indeed, i.e., Western Europe's ability
                           to make large investments in Russia and to influence international credits and guarantees to Russia,
                           e.g., the World Bank. 
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                    10.See Richard Nixon's In the Arena (p. 329) and The Real War (pp. 134 and 142).
                    11.The dispute is over the Kuril Islands (four islands located north of Hokkaido, one of Japan's home
                           islands) which were occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The total disputed area
                           is less than 2,000 square miles. Unfortunately, territory is a secondary consideration when contrasted
 with national pride and prestige. 
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